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LOST OPPORTUNITY: CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
ON THE FINKIN CRITIQUEt
KARL

E.

KLARE*

I share Professor Finkin's view that it is time to wind down this
debate, but I do so with a sense of regret. To my disappointment
and to the misfortune of the entire labor law community, Finkin's
sardonic put down of the emerging "critical" approach represents
little more than a lost opportunity to share in dialogue and clarification.' Finkin's personalized focus and uncivil tone limited the possibility of a productive exchange between us. In fashioning my initial
reply2 to Finkin's critique, I believed it possible to begin a genuine
and searching conversation between the "critical" and traditional
perspectives. After reading Finkin's rejoinder,3 however, I am convinced that further progress toward authentic dialogue must await
another occasion and a different context.
One gets the impression that Finkin is also disappointed by the
way things turned out, but for different reasons. Finkin is an able
polemicist with a keen eye for argumentative advantage, but he
never invested the necessary patience and care to make his critique a
convincing advertisement for traditional legal scholarship. No
doubt he could have done a much better job, but he seems to have
supposed that a hodge podge of points taken out of context, strung
together with a few sarcasms and a Walt Disney song, would convince all right-thinking people that my much-debated article has
nothing whatever of value to offer.
Finkin's basic and essentially his only message was that the critical approach to labor law is not worth taking seriously. To be convincing, however, the author of such a critique must take the
opposing viewpoint very seriously, at least for purposes of discussion. He or she must make an honest effort to learn something
t © Copyright 1986 by Karl E. Klare.
* Professor of Law, Northeastern University.
1. Finkin, Revisionism in Labor Law, 43 MD. L.
Revisionism 1.

REV.

23 (1984) thereinafter Finkin,

2. Klare, Traditional Labor Law Scholarship and the Crisis of Collective BargainingLaw: A
Reply to Professor Finkin, 44 MD. L. REV. 731 (1985) [hereinafter Klare, Reply].
3. Finkin, Does Karl Klare Protest Too Much?, 44 MD. L. REV. 1100 (1985) thereinafter
Finkin, Protest].
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about the approach under attack; to become acquainted with the relevant literature; to familiarize him- or herself with the problems that
have been identified and addressed; in short, to learn something
about the intellectual texture and context of the opposing approach.
The persuasive critic must be particularly careful and scrupulous in
setting out and analyzing the claims his or her oppponents make on
behalf of their methods.
These things Finkin was never prepared to do. By his own account he concluded, on an "initial (if hasty) reading," 4 that the articles written by Katherine Stone 5 and myself( were not worth much.
He returned to them later, ostensibly to determine whether they are
"serious works to which attention must be paid," 7 but in fact simply
to correct the error of the misguided academic audiences that had
found our work of interest.'
Finkin's critique turned out to be a concatenation of primitive
misunderstandings and imprecise, sometimes fatuous readings of
my article. My initial reply has refuted Finkin's specific charges in
detail. ' ) I need not cover that territory again, except to note that
Finkin's rejoinder makes no response to, nor does it take issue with
my treatment of, any of the specific historical or legal issues discussed in my reply. Finkin failed to provide an accurate and balanced account of my position or the questions I addressed, though
he purported to summarize a seventy-four-page article in three
crude and conclusory paragraphs." The task of summarizing was
made easier, of course, by ignoring my subsequent work and virtually the entire relevant methodological literature. Moreover, Finkin
criticized me for arguments that are precisely the opposite of those I
actually advanced, and he repeatedly criticized views speculatively
and wrongly imputed to me. Thejoke of it all is that he did so in the
name of "scholarly standards."''
4. Finkin, Revisionism, supra note 1, at 23.
5. Stone, The Post-11arParadigm in American Labor Law, 90 YAI.E L.J. 1509 (1981).
6. Klare, judicial Deradicalization of the lIagner Act and the Origins of .Mlodern Legal
Consciosmness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REv. 265 (1978) Ihereinafter Klare, Judicial
Deradicalization 1.
7. Finkin, Revisionism, supra note I, at 23.

8. Finkin gives the game away by immediately adding "laind. if they are not Iserious works], why are they being taken seriously at places that ought to know better?" Id.
9. Klare, Reply, supra note 2.
10. Finkin, Revisionism, supra note I, at 24-25.
II. See id. at 86; Finkin, Protest, supra note 3, at 1101-02. There is a most peculiar
convention in contemporary academic dialogue pursuant to which critics are licensed to
attack critical legal studies (CLS) authors in the name of scholarship and professionalism
without meeting even the most minimal scholarly obligation faithfully and accurately to
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Finkin must come forward with a more substantial critique if he
portray their opponents' work. Indeed, critics of CLS tend to project onto our scholarship, about which they often seem to know or care very little, a series of images about
what they think we must believe in light of the political attitudes CLS symbolizes for them
and in light of common perceptions within the profession of CLS's "style."
I will mention two striking examples of this phenomenon in addition to Finkin's
critique. Dean Paul D. Carrington recently argued that persons engaged in CLS scholarship will necessarily end up teaching law students the ways of corruption, bribery, and
intimidation, and that therefore CLS scholars have an ethical duty to resign their positions as law teachers. See Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222, 227
(1984). Carrington cryptically dubbed his opponents "legal nihilists." Despite his occasional denials, he has several times indicated, and it is generally understood, that he
attributes the dangers he sees to the CLS movement. See Finman, Critical Legal Studies,
Professionalism, and Academic Freedom: Exploring the Tributaries of Carrngton 's River, 35 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 180, 181 & 181 n. 7 (1985). Carrington's sole specific example of "legal
nihilism" is a reference to Roberto Unger's The CriticalLegal Studies VMovement, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 563 (1983), a singularly inapt candidate for the label. Carrington later said that
"[elven if I recede from my citation of Unger, I do not recant my expression of concern.
There is a problem. I have seen it in living color and in person . . . (f some or all CLS
folks can and will disavow the idea that legal texts do not much matter, I would be
delighted." "Of Law and the River, " and of Nihilism and Academic Freedom, 35 J. LEGAL
EDUC. I, 12 (exchange of correspondence; letter from Dean Carrington to Professor
Robert W. Gordon). Carrington has never quoted from or otherwise shown that any
CLS-related work advances the idea that "legal texts do not much matter." Indeed,
Dean Carrington has never specifically analyzed a body of CLS work so as to demonstrate that anyone associated with the CLS movement actually holds the views he attributes to it.
In fact, as Professor Gordon has ably shown, CLS scholarship explicitly or implicitly
repudiates virtually every proposition that Carrington attributes to the critical approach.
See id. at 1-9 (1985) (exchange of correspondence; letter from Professor Gordon to Dean
Carrington). Sadly enough, however, Gordon's patient refutation is beside the point.
The Carrington article and much of the debate it has provoked are not really about the
ideas contained in CLS scholarship. As Gordon has shown, these debates are really
concerned with various images academics hold regarding what they think the "crits"
must believe. Hence, the implied license to ignore the actual writings produced within
the CLS movement when criticizing it.
A second example is Professor William E. Nelson's critique of the work of CLS legal
historians, See Nelson, Legal and Constitutional tHistory, 1984 ANN. SURVEY OF AM. LAw
227. In his survey of works on legal history by scholars associated with the CLS movement, Nelson chooses as his examples of representative works three books written by
scholars with no connection to the critical legal studies movement. See id. at 229-32
(citing J. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITIIOUT LAW (1983) as a "seminal critical legal studies
work"; citing W. CHASE, IIIE AMERICAN LAW ScHooL. ANt) TiE RISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE
GOVERNMENT (1982) as a work "typical of those recently written by members of the

[CLS1 movement"; and citingJ. BAER, EQUALI.rrY UNDER TiE CONSTITUTION: RECLAIMING
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1983) as a "book within the rubric of critical legal studies").
Nelson does include a few passing references and citations to works by historians
who are actually associated with the CLS movement. For example, he mentions that he
had difficulty obtaining a copy of Mark Tushnet's Ti'tE AMERICAN LAW OF S AVERY, 18101860 (1981). But Nelson does not discuss or describe lushnet's approach. Rather he
simply asserts that Tushnet's book contains "not the objective facts . . .but a Marxist
interpretation of those facts." Nelson, Legal and Constitutional istory, at 232 (citation
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is to vindicate his approach. He must offer some theory of his own
as to how and why the labor law process unfolded as it did, and how
the law serves and/or impedes industrial democracy. At the very
least he must address himself to the fact that the pat, simplistic version he initially offered of the early Wagner Act cases does not
square with the historical record. And at this point he really is obligated to articulate his own understanding of the methods of legal
reasoning. In short, he must expose and defend his own theoretical
and historical assumptions.
Unfortunately, Finkin has no theoretical or historical ideas, at
least none that he is willing to expose to the scrutiny of debate, and
he seems proud of this fact. Without irony he proclaims himself an
"ad hoc, unsystematic tinker."' 2 He seems to regard "intellection"-by which he presumably means theoretical reflection-as the
enemy of labor law scholarship, 3 and to view intellectuals as enemies of the working class.' 4 And so in his rejoinder Finkin makes a
brief and very belated stab at addressing the methodological differences between us, contemptuously dismisses my work, and bows
out.
No purpose would be served by extending this debate with a
omitted). We are to assume, of course, that because of the Marxist influence on his
work, Tushnet is incapable of scholarly objectivity. Certainly Nelson deems it unnecessary to support the charge, since he fails to indicate any way in which Tushnet's interpretation is biased or distorted, nor does he cite a single passage or argument in Tushnet's
book that he finds objectionable. (By the way, while Tushnet has written in the Marxist
tradition, he has also published an exceedingly trenchant criticism of existing approaches to creating a Marxist legal theory. See Tushnet, Book Review, 68 CORNELL L.
REv. 281 (1982) (reviewing HUGH COLLINS, MARXISM & LAw (1982))). In another instance, apparently by mistake, Nelson cites an article by a "critical" scholar in a list of
works of "traditional" historical scholarship of which he approves. Nelson, Legal and
Constitutional History, at 253 n. 154 (citing Kainen, Vineteenth (entury Interpretations of the
Federal Contract Clause: The Transformation From I'ested to Substantive Rights Against the State,
31 BUFF. L. REV. 381 (1982)).
Having in this fashion completed his survey of CLS works on legal history without
substantive discussion of a single work of a single critical legal studies historian, Nelson
then delivers a most strident attack on the defects of CLS scholarship. Paralleling Carrington's views on teaching, Nelson expresses the opinion that one cannot practice competent, professional legal scholarship, at least in certain fields such as constitutional law,
unless one agrees with a specified set of political assumptions and values. Nelson, Legal
and Constitutional History, at 250-5 1. What is astounding is that Nelson could purport to
write this attack in defense of scholarly objectivity, civility, and "the gentlemanly style,"
id. at 228, of scholarly debate.
This footnote draws upon Professor Gordon's unpublished essay-length letter to
Professor Nelson (dated Aug. 26, 1985, copy on lile with the M1arland Lau, Review).
12. Finkin, Protest, supra note 3, at I110.
13. Finkin, Revisionism, supra note I, at 87.
14. Id. at 87-88.
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detailed refutation of Finkin's rejoinder. I will comment briefly on
the methodological issue Finkin has raised, offer a few concluding
observations on why Finkin passed like the proverbial ship in the
night, and renew the call for meaningful dialogue between the traditional and critical approaches to labor law scholarship.
I.
A Point of Methodology
Belatedly, and as though thinking aloud, Finkin in his rejoinder
wanders about attempting to come to grips for the first time with the
jurisprudential issues involved in this debate. One point he raises is
worth discussing because Finkin's error is so basic and revealing
that an elucidation of that point might actually serve to clarify an
aspect of this ill-fated dialogue.
The point has to do with the frameworks legal thinkers employ
in explaining the course of judicial and administrative decisionmaking. To put it another way, the question raised concerns how we
describe what happens, or should happen, when decisionmakers apply law to fact. Finkin's perspective encompasses two and only two
explanatory frameworks. The first is the system of legal reasoning,
including not only formalistic arguments (e.g., deduction from precedent), but also "policy" arguments (e.g., derivation of results
from a set of officially sanctioned social policies). Finkin believes
that there is a single, well-defined method of legal reasoning, which
he variously labels "the traditional '"' 5 or "the conventional" approach.' When conventional legal reasoning fails as a descriptive
or analytical tool, Finkin can conceive of only one alternative explanation of the course of legal decisions. In Finkin's second explanatory framework, decisions are the product of mere political choice. 7
Outcomes arrived at in such a way are deemed wholly "arbitrary,"
both in the sense that they are idiosyncratic and unguided, and in
the sense that they reflect decisionmakers' personal preferences.
Thus, Finkin argues, when legislative history is ambiguous on a
point good judges do their best to be guided by it anyway because
the only alternative is that decisionmakers will be "cast adrift in a
sea of political choice."'"
15. Finkin, Protest, supra note 3, at 1103.
16. Id.

17. See id. at 1104.
18. Id. at 1105.
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There are two important problems with Finkin's position. The
first has to do with the indeterminacy of legal reasoning, including
social policy arguments.' By "indeterminacy" I mean that the accepted body of arguments ofjustification do not, as a matter of their
own internal logic, require a single, determinate rule or outcome in a
given case even when carefully and conscientiously applied. Clearly
the lawyer's traditional forms and styles of argument exercise constraints on the structure, patterns, and concerns of legal decisions.
That is, these arguments ("legal reasoning") form an important
component of the political culture of the legal process. Certainly no
one in the critical legal studies (CLS) movement has ever denied
this. If anything, a fairly standard criticism made by our sociologically inclined colleagues is that CLS devotes entirely too much attention to the structure of legal argument. On the other hand, since
the rise of Legal Realism it has been common currency among
Americal legal scholars that "legal reasoning" exercises much
weaker constraints on legal outcomes than is often popularly assumed, and that such constraints are indirect, rather than reflecting
a pure matter of logic. All skilled lawyers know this, although for
purposes of advocacy they often speak as though the constraints of
legal reasoning were more compelling than they are.
I will briefly mention a number of the reasons why traditional
legal reasoning imposes weaker and less direct constraints on the
formulation and application of legal rules than is conventionally assumed. Several are basic Legal Realist insights. For one, all fields
of law simultaneously embrace and advance competing and conflicting values. The Realists observed that skilled lawyers are commonly
able to invoke such competing values, and the conflicting lines of
precedent and other authority embodying them, to generate competent legal arguments for opposite outcomes in a given case. In so
doing judges and advocates are not necessarily "distorting" the law
to serve partisan interest or to indulge idiosyncratic whim. They
may well be exercising professional skill in good faith in a context in
which the body of authoritative rules and justifications is itself internally contradictory.
Other sources of indeterminacy in legal reasoning are the extraordinary variety of available precedents and the countless gaps
and ambiguities. There is also the question of "circularity." Legal
reasoning presupposes neutral, initial formulations of the facts, but
in reality characterizing the facts always involves selective judgments
19. See generally Klare, Replv, supra note 2, at 757-64.
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that in turn rest on controversial frames of reference regarding the
parties' background rights and entitlements. Finally there is the
great variety and flexibility of the accepted repertoire of argumentative techniques, e.g., distinguishing inconvenient precedents on the
facts, extending helpful precedents, and altering the perspective on
a case by creative analogy to another field of law. Typically the tools
of legal reasoning themselves lack unambiguous criteria for deter20
mining when one rule or argument trumps another.
Although I will not attempt to defend the point here, the indeterminacy of the accepted canons of justification within the conventional framework of legal reasoning is as much a problem in the
context of modern regulatory statutes, such as the National Labor
Relations Act,"' as in that of older common law fields. As I will explain in a moment, however, the fact that the arguments ofjustification
found in conventional legal reasoning are not tightly determinative
of outcomes does not entail the conclusion that the outcomes themselves
are or must be random and unstructured.
In some ways, much work in the CLS vein can be profitably understood as an effort to extend and deepen this portion (although
not others) of the Legal Realist tradition. Indeed, in my view one of
the most interesting theoretical contributions of CLS has been to
blend the historicism of classical social theory with the Legal Realist
critique of formalism to yield a post-Marxist critique of objectivism
in social theory. - In any event, the level of acrimony in the criticisms of CLS scholarship suggests that these basic lessons of Legal
Realism must be redebated and relearned again by every generation
of American legal scholars. Perhaps Finkin is convinced that these
insights are simply mistaken. Perhaps he has found a way to thread
legal reasoning together at a higher level of coherence than anyone
20. This does not mean that we can never have the experience of closure or "boundness" with respect to legal problems, nor is it a claim that all systems of justification are
inherently indeterminate. Moreover, I recognize that legal rules themselves vary markedly with respect to their degree of "formal realizability," that is. the degree to which
they are self-executing. What I mean to say is that decisonmakers and scholars often
exaggerate how tightly the traditional arguments of legal justification can or do constrain outcomes, and they commonly describe as legally compelled results that are in
fact determined by conscious or unconscious reference to values and criteria external to
legal reasoning.
21. National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982 & Supp.
1984) Ihereinafter "the Act".
22. On this point, see Klare, Reply, supra note 2, at 757-58; "fushnet, Book Review,
supra note 1I; see aLbo Kennedy, The Role of L.aw in Eonomic Thought: Essays on the Fetishism
of Commodities (forthcoming in AM. U.I.. Rvv.) (1985) (making similar point but with
somewhat different formulation and emphasis).
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else has yet achieved. But this is not disclosed in his writing, which
rather more likely shows that he has yet to grasp the jurisprudential
significance of the problem.
The second difficulty with Finkin's position-and this is the
main point of this brief rejoinder-is that there exist other descriptive and analytical frameworks for understanding the decisionmaking process. Finkin's dichotomous formulation errs in assuming
that only two conceptions of legal decisionmaking, based respectively on traditional canons of argument and on personal preference, are possible. But there are alternatives to saying that either
the judge is constrained by legal reasoning or the judge is unguided
and his/her decisions are "merely a matter of 'political' choice. "23
Although Finkin seems genuinely unaware of this, most of what is
interesting in American legal theory of the past thirty or forty years
are attempts to say what does or should fill the gap between traditional legal reasoning and random, arbitrary decisionmaking.24 Indeed, the existence of the sociology of law is premised on the
assumption that there is something to observe and say about what
bridges that gap. That the justifications contained in the standardpanoply
of legal arguments do not tightly and logically determine results does not entail
the conclusion that the outcomes themselves are random or arbitrary.
Precisely the task some in CLS have set for ourselves is to discover and describe the ways in which labor law decisions do form a
coherent whole. Critical labor law scholars have not argued, as
Finkin seems to think, that legal outcomes are unpatterned, nor
have we sought to demonstrate that the outcomes "merely" reflect
the personal political predilections of judges. What CLS scholars
have argued is that, insofar as we can identify patterns and structures within labor law, these patterns reflect and constitute relatively
coherent but often competing visions of how industrial life should
be organized. That is, they reflect sets of values and assumptions
about organization, hierarchy, participation, entitlements, and loyalty; in short, all of the components of a vision of workplace governance. A related claim is that the observable patterns and structures
23. Finkin, Protest, supra note 3, at 1104.
24. Two obvious examples o" such contributions at the normative level are institutional competence theory and the several varieties of law and economics. Prominent
spokespersons for each of these approaches have claimed that institutional compelence
theory or microeconomic analysis can provide a new method for determinate resolution
of legal problems, thereby answering the Realists' implicit challenge to the legitimacy of
legal reasoning. CI.S writers have expressed skepticism on this score, insisting on the
importance of recognizing the element of political judgment that is an irreducible component of all legal decisionmaking. But that is an argument for another day.
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within labor law are not congruent with, and cannot be fully explained by, the stated logic and justifications recognized within the
framework of traditional legal reasoning and conventional scholarship. The critical perspective similarly argues that the institutional
and legal patterns of American industrial relations are not tightly
determined by an underlying metalogic of history or by the inherent
functional needs of advanced industrial societies. If we are correct
in these arguments, it seems a worthwhile scholarly task to uncover
and explore these deeper structures and patterns of meaning. In
demonstrating that the shape and decisional content of labor law
are not tightly determined by traditional rules of legal argument or
by technological imperatives, we thereby expose the possibility that
other governance arrangements are imaginable and might be chosen by the people whose lives are affected by industrial relations
institutions.
Let me briefly illustrate these themes. In closing, Finkin once
again raises the case of NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. ,25 the
basic authority for the rule that employers may permanently replace
economic strikers.2 ' The purpose of Finkin's reference to an obscure, previously unmentioned detail is unclear. 7 There is, however, a subtle but telling shift in Finkin's position. In his original
critique he emphasized that the permanent replacement rule was
"dictum," perhaps to depreciate its significance.2 ' Now he describes the rule as "a dictum that did become law.'2' Despite this
acknowledgement, Finkin's rejoinder, like his critique, simply ignores the real legal and social policy issues of the Mackay Radio case:
What is the industrial relations impact of the rule? Is it necessary?
Is it compelled by the legislative history? If not, why was it adopted
and why has it survived, despite some subsequent qualifications, for
nearly half a century? What outlook on industrial organization does
the rule reflect or express? Above all, is the rule sound or does it
work injustice?
Finkin's theoretical abdication is no accident. His methodology

25. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
26. Id. at 345-46.
27. Finkin purportedly offers his Mackay Radio example as a criticism of' my approach, but it is hard to see why he thinks his point is damaging to anyone's position but
his own. He is seemingly unaware that by exposing this new ambiguity he has actually
illustrated and thereby supported my views about the indeterminacy of the legislative
history.
28. See Finkin, Revisionism, supra note 1, at 25, 36.
29. Finkin, Arotest, supra note 3, at 1106.
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simply does not enable him to ask or confront analytically interesting questions. He does not show, or even purport to show, that the
Mackay Radio rule is dictated by the legislative materials. But his
only alternative to traditional legal argument is to analyze the case
by reference to gut feeling and personal predilection, that is to say,
to fail to provide any analysis of the case at all.
Finkin's approach is inaccurate as well as ineffective. There are
patterns and coherencies to observe. Political choices were and are
made in the evolution of labor law, but these choices are connected,
they can be seen to add up.3 0 By contrast to him, I offered a theory
of the Mackay Radio rule. I argued that it reflected and was an aspect
of an emerging judicial mindset on industrial relations problems, a
mindset also reflected in other contemporaneous opinions.3 1 My
methodology aimed to uncover this mindset and to probe its influence on the evolution of labor law. Discussion of this kind hopefully
enables us to explore with new insight the Mackay Radio rule's place
in labor law and whether the rule should be altered, questions of
great significance to working people.
Frequently at this point in the discussion, skeptics of CLS, having previously criticized what they took to be the political arbitrariness of our approach, now take the view that our point is entirely
trivial. That is, critical scholars are often accused of simply restating
in fancy language ideas that have been conventional learning for
half a century. "Everybody knows," it is said, "that values and assumptions about social life that are external to traditional legal reasoning infiltrate the legal process."
For what it is worth, I very much doubt that CLS scholars are
simply restating universally accepted assumptions about the legal
process. Certainly our critics do not customarily act and write as
though our points about values in the legal process are commonly
accepted. I suspect one of the reasons CLS work arouses such debate is that our claims regarding the role of values and choice in
30. Indeed, these observations are in no sense unique to labor law. See Klare, Replv.
supra note 2, at 759-62 (discussing evolution of case law under the Civil Rights Act of
1964). i)oes Finkin really believe that the only legitimate Form of criticism of recent
Supreme Court retrenchment in civil rights decisions is to argue that the Court has
somehow misunderstood a transparent legislative history?
31. Another example is the important dictum of NI.RB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937) (NI.RA permits employer to refuse to make a collective
contract and to unilaterally determine terms and conditions of employment). Finkin
now acknowledges that this dictum "never became law," Finkin, IP'ofest, supra note 3, at
1105, and that I so recognized. Id. Finkin tells us the literary source of the dictum but
offers no theory of why the Court enunciated it.

1985]

KLARE

1121

legal decisionmaking and argument in fact comprise an implicit critique of traditional legal reasoning, of conventional teaching methods and scholarship, and of the legitimacy of the existing case law
process. The depth of belief one encounters in the view that be32
yond traditional legal reasoning lies only personal arbitrariness
betokens some resistance to fully acknowledging the limitations of
conventional legal analysis.
The claims advanced in CLS work on labor law, sketched above,
may or may not be true, and they may or may not contain valuable
contributions to knowledge. One thing, however, is clear. Now
nearly eighty pages into his critique, Finkin has yet to address himself in any substantial way to these claims.
II.
A Failed Dialogue
As I noted in my initial reply, this debate is not occurring in a
vacuum. American collective bargaining is in jeopardy. The percentage of the labor force that participates in collective bargaining
has been steadily declining for many years. Collective bargaining
and workers' rights are under political, economic, and academic attack. And the structure of labor law is not an inessential aspect of
the crisis of collective bargaining. There is a spectrum of views, of
course, but knowledgeable and concerned observers earnestly warn
that prevailing interpretations of the Act have increased the risks
and decreased the value of collective bargaining to workers. Some
proclaim outright that "[l]abor law has failed."3 "
Indeed, Finkin must be just about the only informed observer
in the country who counts himself among the friends of collective
bargaining but who does not think that the labor law system is in
32. Professor Finkin is not alone in this belief. Professor Nelson also incorrectly
assumes that if the critical scholars argue that the law's own stated rules ofjustification
do not tightly determine outcomes, the CIS scholars must therefore be arguing that law
is grounded "only in the self-interest or political values of judges," Nelson, supra note
11, at 250, and that "law is simply the product of political choice." Id. at 230 (emphasis
added). In a similar vein, Nelson states that "Ithe primary argument of critical legal
studies theorists . . . is that the rule of law is a concept without meaning." Id. at 254.
This attribution to CLS is also plainly incorrect. See, e.g., Klare, Law-Afaking As Pra.xis,
TELOS, Summer 1979, at 123, 133-34 (viewing legalism as great achievement of human
culture). See aLo Kennedy, Freedom and Contraint in Adjudiration: Toward a CriticalP/henomenology of the Rule of Law (forthcoming, manuscript on file with the Iar, land L.aw Review).
3.3. House Subcomm. On Labor-AJanagement Relations of the Comm. on Edur. and Labor, The
Failure of Labor Law-A Betrayal of American Jl'orkers, H.R. REi'. No. 98, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. I (1984). See generally Klare, Reply, supra note I, at 733-34 and sources cited.
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deep trouble. At least from all that appears in his article, labor law
is as healthy and robust as ever. All the old assumptions and perceptions remain valid. There is no need even to consider whether a
fresh viewpoint would be helpful. So far as we can tell from his critique, the only cloud on the horizon is that some misguided souls
haven't gotten the message.
But I suppose we ought not to take Finkin's article at face value.
Suppose, instead, we assume that Finkin knows what is plain for all
to see about the current crisis of collective bargaining and of labor
law. Then we must ask why a self-professed friend of collective bargaining would, at a time in which industrial democracy is on the defensive, devote so much energy to a campaign conducted in the
most self-important and intemperate terms for no apparent purpose
other than to make sure the world knows it should pay no attention
to the work of Katherine Stone and myself.
There is a sense in which the attention should be flattering. I
do believe that the issues Stone and I have raised rightfully belong
on the agenda of those who care about the future of collective bargaining. The energy Finkin has devoted to this campaign might
ironically be taken as a tacit acknowledgment that our overall effort
to challenge and rethink fundamental assumptions, if not our particular arguments, should command the attention of those committed
to the revival of the labor movement and to a concomitant redirection of labor law scholarship.
Unfortunately, Finkin does not appear to have approached the
debate with an eye toward the difficult and pressing issues now confronting the collective bargaining system. Rather, the only salient
aspect of Finkin's contribution to the debate seems to be a passionate need, for reasons entirely unknown, to vindicate a personal
sense of grievance and of wounded pride that some lawyers, scholars, and labor activists have found something of interest in Stone's
and my work.
In times past academic labor lawyers-"intellectuals" if you
will-played an important role in working out the legal theory of,
and thereby advancing, collective bargaining. This role was (and always will be) secondary to working peoples' own efforts to expand
and give meaning to industrial democracy. Nonetheless it was an
essential role. Our predecessors set a high standard of creativity
and sophistication in labor law theory. One can only hope that contemporary labor law scholarship will match that standard. Certainly
we can demand no less of ourselves than to aspire to reach that
level.
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Finkin's critique is not a step in that direction. So long as he
remains unwilling to take alternative viewpoints seriously enough to
devote to them the scholarly care and judgment of which he is no
doubt capable, there is little likelihood that he can spark the sort of
debate that will be fruitful for the labor law community as a whole.
This is truly a pity. Searching debate, now more than ever, is essential to intellectual progress on the agenda facing labor law scholars.
I welcome criticism of CLS labor law scholarship. Friends of industrial democracy in academic life, including CLS scholars, have nothing to lose and everything to gain from vigorous, probing
confrontation with each other's ideas. In that spirit, I conclude by
expressing the hope that Finkin's personalistic polemics will turn
out in retrospect to have been a temporary detour on the path toward a genuine dialogue between the critical and traditional approaches to labor law.

